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Abstract: The island province of Orkney played a crucial role in Norway’s overseas expansion 
during the Early  and High Middle Ages. Located just offshore from mainland Scotland, it 
provided a resort for westward sailing fleets as well as a convenient springboard for military 
forays into Britain and down the Irish Sea. The establishment of a Norwegian Scottish peace 
and the demarcation of fixed political boundaries in 1266 led to a revision of Orkney’s role in 
the Norwegian realm. From that point until the its pledging to the Scottish Crown in 1468, 
Norway depended on Orkney as a hub for diplomacy and foreign relations. This paper looks at 
how  Orkney  figured  in  Norwegian  royal  strategies  in  the  west  and  presents  key  examples 
which show its transition from a tool of war to a forum for peace.  
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Introduction 
 
For roughly seven centuries, from the late eighth until the late fifteenth centuries, the North 
Sea archipelago of Orkney was under varying degrees of influence and overlordship of the 
Kingdom of Norway. It was one of a string of North Sea and North Atlantic islands including 
Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroes, Shetland, and until 1266 the Hebrides and Man, known in 
contemporary texts as skattlondum (tributary countries) of the King of Norway. As the term 
indicates, each of these islands owed ‘skatt’, a tribute or tax to Crown, although the exact 
nature and amount of those tributes continue to elude historians. While acts of submission by 
native chieftains, including the imbursement of a lump sum of wealth, appear to have been a 
staple means of tribute in the Early and High Middle Ages, the late medieval systems were 
based on regular renders provided by wider segments of the provincial communities (Imsen, 
2011,  pp.  13 23).  Unfortunately,  the  scarcity  of  source  material  makes  it  difficult  to  fully 
appreciate the significance of economies in the Crown’s relations to these dependencies. For 
Orkney,  this  is  particularly  so.  Most  of  what  is  known  of  Orkney’s  medieval  economy  is 
derived from vague narrative references and optimistic reconstructions of land valuations based 
on earlier material (Marwick, 1952, pp. 206 7; Thomson, 1996; Thomson, 2001, pp. 214 5; 
Crawford, 2008). While it might be assumed that Orcadian capital figured prominently into the 
strategies of Norwegian kings, there is scant evidence of how and to what extent.  
But there were other incentives for lordship over Orkney. Prior to the late thirteenth 
century, there were few limits to the scope of Norway’s quest for power in the west. The 
horizon stretched far beyond Cape Wrath, past Scotland’s western seaboard and deep into the 
Irish  Sea.  Ian  Beuermann  viewed  the  Irish  Sea  and  the  adjacent  shorelines  as  a  single 
geopolitical zone which he referred to as the ‘Viking Crescent’ (Beuermann, 2006, pp. 6, 88). I. P. Grohse 
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The richest, most prestigious and most coveted part of that zone was Dublin (ibid., p. 88), 
though  from  a  strategic  standpoint,  the  Hebrides  and  Man  were  most  pivotal  in  terms  of 
military  and political control of the region as a whole (Beuermann, 2006, pp. 1, 275). As 
Beuermann noted, the Hebrides “are the link between Ireland and Scotland, and Man is the 
stepping stone between England and Ireland, Scotland and Wales” (ibid., p. 1). The Viking 
Crescent was an exceptional avenue for prosperity. Dues from pastoral farming, combined with 
a consistent flow of wealth from trade and plunder, made the region, at least until the late 
thirteenth century, “worth the while” of Norwegian kings (Beuermann, 2011; Oram, 2011). 
The most celebrated of those kings were those who risked their fortunes on the seas and hostile 
shores of Scotland, England, Wales, Man and Ireland. It was there, and not Orkney, where 
kings staked their greatest claims to wealth and power.  
That  region  was  not,  however,  exclusively  theirs  for  the  taking.  Not  only  were 
Norwegian rulers challenged to assert their suzerain authority over the petty kingdoms of Man 
and the Isles and of Dublin: they were also faced by the formidable crowns of England and 
Scotland. In order to maintain an edge in this contentious and violent zone, Norwegian kings 
required a more permanent foothold, and it was here that Orkney fits into the scene. Situated 
just a few miles off the northern tip of the Scottish mainland, Orkney provided a fulcrum for 
forays south into Britain and further down into the Irish Sea. Logistically speaking, it was 
Norway’s most crucial overseas hub, with nearly every major Norwegian fleet en route to 
Britain  or  Ireland  passing  through  its  harbours.  It  was  also  securely  under  Norwegian 
domination.  Whereas  the  islands  and  coastal  regions  of  the  Irish  Sea  were  the  objects  of 
competition between rival kingdoms for much of the Early  and High Middle Ages, Orkney 
was subject to the exclusive overlordship of Norway’s kings. Without interference, those kings 
were safe to use Orkney as a basis for their expansive campaigns.   
As Norway’s fortunes in the west waned and, eventually, faltered completely under the 
weight of Scottish encroachment in the late thirteenth century, the nature of the advantage 
provided by Orkney’s proximity to Britain changed from that of providing a base for war to 
that of providing a base for diplomacy. In 1266, Norway formally remitted all claims west of 
Cape Wrath. The Hebrides and Man, which had long been contested areas, were from then on 
squarely in Scotland’s area of control. With those disputes put to rest, Norway’s relations to 
Scotland took on a decidedly more peaceful and cooperative character. As military concerns 
gave way to strategies for a new brand of North Sea diplomacy, Orkney’s purpose changed to 
that of a peaceful and secure point of assembly for royal envoys and other agents.  
It is beyond the scope of this modest contribution to present a full survey of war and 
peace in medieval Orkney. Instead, these features will be discussed, albeit briefly, each by way 
of several illustrative cases. The goal is simply to show that Orkney was more than just a quick 
and easy source of wealth for the Norwegian Crown. Rather, it was Norway’s most durable 
and advantageous window to the west.  
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Figure  1:  Map  of  Britain,  Ireland  and  surrounding  isles.  The  unconventional 
arrangement depicts contemporary Norse perspectives toward the region’s geography. 
Orkney  and  Shetland  were  known  in  medieval  Norse  texts  as  the  ‘Northern  Isles’ 
(Norðreyjar) while the Hebrides, known today as the ‘Western Isles’, were referred to as 
the  ‘Southern  Isles’  (Suðreyjar).  Sailors  from  Norway  ventured  first  ‘west  over  sea’ 
before steering south toward the Hebrides and into the Irish Sea. 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author. 
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Geographic framework 
 
As suggested above, Orkney’s role in the medieval realm of Norway was dictated first and 
foremost by its uniquely advantageous geography. In order to appreciate this, one must first 
place it on what Tatjana N. Jackson referred to as the ‘mental map of medieval Scandinavians’ 
(Jackson, 2009). From a Norwegian perspective, Orkney fell within a broad ‘western quadrant’ 
comprising  multiple  Atlantic  lands  and  islands,  including  also  Iceland,  Shetland,  Britain, 
Ireland and even France, Spain and Africa. Within that zone, Norsemen used several different 
‘western ways’ (vestrvegir) or fixed and frequented sailing itineraries in order to reach their 
destinations (ibid., pp. 213 4; Ridel, 2007). One of the most utilized of those routes in the 
Early  and High Middle Ages was that which led through Orkney, around the northern coasts 
of Britain and down into the Irish Sea. Contemporary observers appreciated that this was a 
south western trajectory and termed the isles according to their apposition to one another, as 
well as to Norway; Orkney and Shetland were referred to as the ‘Northern Isles’ (Norðreyjar) 
while the Hebrides were known collectively as the ‘Southern Isles’ or ‘Sudreys’ (Suðreyjar) 
(Beuermann, 2006, p. 6). The fact that Orkney and Shetland were viewed as northern islands 
implies, perhaps, that Norse observers  appreciated their proximity and  close association to 
Norway (the ‘Northern way’ = Norðrvegr) more than they did the more distant territories to the 
south and west.  
Orkney’s principle town of Kirkwall lies just over two hundred and sixty nautical miles 
from Bergen, perhaps a daunting distance from a modern, land locked perspective, but not so 
disheartening  for  the  experienced  seafarers  of  the  medieval  North  Sea  world.  An  early 
expression of this view of the perceived proximity of Orkney and Norway comes from the 
12th century Historia Norwegiæ: 
 
Certain islands lying close to Gulatingslag [of Western Norway] are called by their 
inhabitants the Solund  Islands, from which the  sea that flows between  Norway  and 
Ireland is known as the Solund Sea. In these waters are situated the Orkney Islands, 
totaling over thirty and named after a particular Earl Orkan. They are populated by 
different peoples and now split into two domains; the southern isles have been elevated 
by petty kings, the northern graced by the protection of earls, both of whom pay no 
mean tribute to the kings of Norway (HN, 2003, p. 65).
1 
 
Several things are noteworthy here. First, the author viewed the islands as lying “close to” 
Western  Norway,  a  clear  indication  that  contemporary  observers  had  a  relatively  liberal 
perception  of  proximity  by  sea.  It  also  underscores  the  idea  that  there  was  a  perceived 
association  between  Orkney  and  the  Norwegian  mainland.  Second,  the  author  placed  the 
islands directly in “the sea that flows between Norway and Ireland”, thus implying that the 
isles were intermediary points between two prominent countries. The fact that the writer uses 
such a distant, western point of reference as Ireland when locating the isles shows that Norse 
travelers were frequently aiming for a far flung trajectory. The isles, however important in 
                                                           
1 “[S]unt ergo quedam insule preiacentes Gulacie, que ab incolis Solunde nominantur, unde Solundicum Mare 
dictum, quod inter Norwegiam et Iberniam fluit. In quo sunt Orchades insule numero plusquam XXX, a quodam 
comite Orchano nomine uocate. Que quidem diuresis incolis acculte nunc in duo regna sun diuise: Sunt enim 
Meradiane Insule regulis sublimate, Brumales uero comitum presidio decorate, qui utrique regibus Norwegie non 
modica persoluunt tribute” (HN, 2003, p. 64).                                                                                    Orkney in the Medieval Realm of Norway 
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their own right, were more importantly points along the way. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
author groups Orkney (and presumably Shetland as well) together with the Hebrides, those 
being the southern isles ruled by petty kings. Once again, Orkney is classified, not as a free 
standing entity, but rather as part of a much wider sphere of influence (Wærdahl, 2011, pp. 31 
4). The southern waters separating Orkney from Scotland, though far narrower at just over five 
nautical miles, were apparently more foreboding:  
 
At that [earlier] period these islands were not called the Orkneys but rather Pentland, so 
that the sea which separates the islands from Scotland is still known by the natives as 
the  Pentland  Firth;  here  is  the  most  gigantic  of  all  whirlpools,  which  draws  in  and 
swallows the stoutest vessels at ebb tide, and at hightide spews up and disgorges their 
wreckage (HN, 2003, p. 65).
2 
 
Despite its rather fantastic imagery, the author’s portrayal of the Pentland Firth as violent and 
treacherous has a grain of truth to it. The strong tidal streams give rise to forceful eddies 
which, as the quote alludes, cost countless lives over the ages (Crawford, 1987, pp. 21 2.). 
However,  the  Pentland  Firth  was  clearly  not  as  prohibitive  a  barrier  as  this  text  implies. 
Archeological evidence shows a strong prehistoric tradition of contact and settlement between 
the  isles  and  the  mainland  (Thomson,  2001,  pp.  1 23;  Woolf,  2007,  p.  13)  and  historical 
narratives relate numerous and, more often than not unencumbered, commutes between the 
isles  and  Caithness  on  the  mainland.  In  his  stressing  the  dangers  of  the  strait,  the  author 
emphasized that Orkney was in no manner of speaking a part of Scotland. Though close, it was 
definitively one of those islands which paid “no mean tribute to the kings of Norway” and to 
none other. 
Alex Woolf termed this string of islands the ‘Shetland corridor’ in reference to the 
region’s northernmost archipelago (Woolf, 2007, p. 54). Shetland, being almost as close to 
western Norway as it is to the Scottish mainland, appears to have been the first point of call for 
western voyages. The author of Historia Norwegiæ may have had these islands in mind when 
speaking of those “lying close” to western Norway. And yet, as a rule, Shetland was not a 
direct point of departure for forays onto mainland Britain or into the Irish Sea. Stops there were 
generally followed by longer and busier layovers in Orkney before proceeding further south or 
west. Orkney’s tighter proximity and access to Britain helps explain why it, and not Shetland, 
became the principal headquarters of the Earldom and later the Bishopric. 
 
Warfare 
 
Incentives for Norway’s overseas expansion are far too many and complex to discuss in full 
here, though as noted, access to wealth and the prestige which accompanied it were major 
inducements for forays into Britain and the Irish Sea. While we should assume that some of 
these ventures were peaceful, the narrative sources tend to highlight those of a violent nature. 
The heading ‘warfare’ is employed in a most liberal and intentionally provocative sense of 
‘armed conflict’. In reality, the earliest examples of armed conflict dealt with here bear nothing 
of  the  more  prevalent,  modern  concept  of  war  as  an  official,  large scale  conflict  between 
                                                           
2 “Sed eo tempore non Orchades, ymmo Terra Petorum dicebantur, unde adhuc Petlandicum Mare ab incolis 
appellatur,  quod  seiungit  insulas  a  Scotia,  ubi  omnium  maxima  uorago,  que  fortissimas  naues  per  ledonem 
attrahendo diglutit, earundem fragmenta per malenam eructando euomit. (HN, 2003, p. 64). I. P. Grohse 
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different political units. As there was a gradual coalescence into cohesive kingdoms, Norway 
and Scotland, and sub polities, the Earldom of Orkney and the Kingdom of Man and the Isles, 
engaged  in  increasingly  formalized  expression  of  violence,  the  culmination  being  the 
Norwegian Scottish conflict of 1263. Of interest here is how Orkney figured in that process, 
how it was used to access, exploit and secure wealth. To start, one must look to the west.  
According to tradition, the founding of Orkney as a Norse earldom in the late ninth 
century occurred in the course of a military campaign. Accounts of King Harald hárfagri’s 
(‘Fair hair’s’) supposed conquest of Orkney vary somewhat, though the two most often cited 
sources, Orkneyinga saga and Heimskringla, tell more or less the same story: certain privateers 
had been using Shetland and Orkney as winter bases for their summer raids into Norway. 
Growing  weary  of  their  attacks,  the  king  sailed  west  over  sea  one  summer,  conquering 
Shetland,  Orkney  and  then  the  Hebrides  before  sailing  down  the  Irish  Sea,  plundering  in 
Scotland and laying the Isle of Man under his control. One of the king’s vassals, Rognvald, lost 
his son during the campaign and was compensated with a grant of Orkney and Shetland, the 
two parts of a new earldom.
3 Historians have raised doubts as to the veracity of these saga 
accounts, all of which were composed centuries after the events reported (Crawford, 1987, pp. 
53 6; Downham, 2004; Woolf, 2007, pp. 277 8, 307). Indeed, it is perhaps more useful to 
focus on the perceptions expressed in the stories rather than the historical facts. From that 
perspective, we see that Orkney was viewed not as an ‘insular’ case, but as part of a much 
further flung  string  of  islands  under  Norwegian  control.  The  pinnacle  of  King  Harald’s 
legendary  campaign  was  not  the  submission  of  Orkney,  but  his  broader  plundering  and 
conquests in the Irish Sea. Orkneyinga saga, for instance, says that “[Harald] travelled all the 
way west to Man and plundered the villages of Man. During his campaign he fought a number 
of battles, winning himself territories further west than any King of Norway has done since” 
(OSb, 1981, p. 26).
4 According to Historia Norwegie, Orkney was a launching pad for these 
ventures:  
 
When they had gained safety and security by building winter residences, they went off 
in summer on pirating expeditions against the English and the Scots, and occasionally 
on  the  Irish;  the  result  was  that  in  England  they  brought  Northumbria,  in  Scotland 
Caithness, and in Ireland Dublin and all the other coastal towns under their domination 
(HN, 2003, p. 67).
5 
 
Orkney’s proximity to Britain and the  Irish Sea would prove itself advantageous time and 
again for westward oriented rulers. A generation later, Harald’s son, Erik blóðöx (‘Blood ax’), 
is said to have taken Orkney as his base of power during his campaigns to seize the kingdom of 
Northumberland in the mid tenth century (Downham, 2004). The legendary campaign went as 
follows: Having been deposed from Norway in 935, Erik first sailed to Orkney, where he 
collected reinforcements before sailing south toward England, plundering in Scotland along the 
way. After securing the kingship of Northumberland, Erik returned to Orkney, which he then 
                                                           
3 The account offered in Historia Norwegiæ reports that it was the kinsmen of Rognvaldr who led the campaign. 
4 “hann fór allt vestr í Mǫn ok eyddi Manarbyggðina. Hann átti þar margar orrostur ok eignaðisk lǫnd svá langt 
vestr, at engi Nóregskonungr hefir lengra síðan” (OSa, 1987, p. 8). 
5 “Vbi securius hiemalibus sedibus muniti, estiuo tempore tum in Anglos, tum in Scotos, quandoque in Hibernios 
suam excercentes tyrannidem ierunt, ut de Anglia Northimbriam, de Scotia Kathanasiam, de Hybernia Diflinniam 
ceterasque maritimas urbes suo imperio subiugarent.” (HN, 2003, p. 66).                                                                                  Orkney in the Medieval Realm of Norway 
  261
used as a winter base for his summer raids in Scotland, the Hebrides, Ireland and Wales. When 
his kingship in England was challenged, Erik secured the support of Orkney’s earls before 
heading into the Irish Sea once more and finally back to England where he died attempting to 
enforce  his  claim.  The  story  was  much  the  same  over  a  century  later  when  King  Harald 
harðraði (‘Hard rule’) arrived in Orkney in 1066. Aiming to assert his claim to the English 
throne, Harald sailed first to Shetland, and then to Orkney, “where his force grew considerably, 
and both earls [of Orkney] decided to join him” (OSb, 1981, p. 77).
6 He left behind his queen 
and  their  two  daughters  before  pushing  south  and  ultimately  meeting  his  end  at  Stamford 
Bridge. 
Although  many  of  the  details  of  these  accounts  are  dubious,  they  demonstrate  that 
Orkney was generally appreciated as a crucial point of assembly and an essential source of 
manpower. Its use in recruiting armed men reflects the strength of the earls and the extent of 
their  local  military  apparatuses.  In  joining  the  Norwegian  lords  on  their  expeditions  into 
England, the earls most likely brought with them the strength of their kinsmen, friends and 
vassals, thus swelling the ranks of the Norwegian forces. The episodes also show that Orkney 
represented a secure resort in an otherwise precarious region. While both kings met their deaths 
in battles on the British mainland, their experiences in Orkney are portrayed as unremarkable 
and safe. The fact that King Harald harðraði relied on Orkney as a haven for his wife and 
daughters is testament to its security. Most importantly, the episodes provide further proof that 
Orkney was valued as a stepping stone to other, more desirable lands. It was not as much an 
aim as it was a means to a much further, more illustrious end.  
Orkney’s purpose in the westward push is demonstrated most outstandingly in accounts 
of King Magnus berfœttr’s (‘Bare legs’) campaigns into the Irish Sea in 1098. Orkneyinga 
saga tells us that Magnus was “an ambitious man and greedy for power in other lands” (OSb, 
1981,  p.  83).
7  Recognizing  this,  a  former  earl,  who  was  set  to  benefit  from  the  king’s 
intervention, persuaded him to lead an army to conquer Orkney just as King Harald hárfagri 
had done. But this “princely” (hǫfðingsbragð) endeavour in Orkney was in and of itself not 
incentive enough for the king. Magnus agreed only after the earl reminded him that in seizing 
the Hebrides, “it would be easy for him to raid from there in Ireland and Scotland and, once 
these western regions were his, he could get reinforcements from Norway and lead an army 
against the English" (ibid., p. 83).
8 After gathering many fine men and a formidable fleet, 
Magnus sailed west, stopping first in Orkney to replacing the reigning earls with his own son 
and a host of councilors. His stay in there was brief. As advertised, he quickly proceeded to 
Hebrides, which he took under his control before turning further south to the coasts of Wales. 
There,  he  is  reported  to  have  won  a  “famous  victory”  over  the  Welsh,  eventually  taking 
possession of Anglesey, “which lies as far south as any region ever ruled by the former kings 
of Norway and comprises a third part of Wales” (ibid., p. 85).
9 On his return journey, King 
Magnus laid his claim to Kintyre and, according to the saga, made peace with King Malcolm 
of Scotland in an agreement whereby Magnus could take “all the islands off the west coast of 
Scotland which were separated by water navigable by a ship with the rudder set” (ibid., p. 
                                                           
6 “Ór Orkneyjum hafði hann lið mikit; réðusk jarlar báðir til ferðar með konungi.” (OSa, 1987, p. 86). 
7 “stórráðr ok ágjarn á ríki annarra hǫfðingsbragð.”(ibid., p. 93). 
8 “ef hann fengi ríki i Suðreyjum, at þaðan væri hægt at herja á Írland ok Skotland, ok ef hann kæmi undir sik 
Vestrlǫndum, at þaðan væri gott at eflask með styrk Norðmanna á móti Englismǫnnum.” (ibid., pp. 93 94). 
9 “sem inir fyrri Nóregskonungar hǫfðu lengst eignazk suðr, Ǫngulsey er þriðjungr Bretlands.” (ibid., p. 97). I. P. Grohse 
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86).
10  In  an  exceptionally  crafty  manoeuvre,  Magnus  had  the  ship  carried  over  land,  thus 
winning the whole of Kintyre, which according to the saga “is thought to be more valuable 
than the best of the Hebridean islands, though not as good as the Isle of Man” (ibid., p. 86).
11 
Again, the authenticity and details of the account are questionable (Power, 1986), but it is 
interesting to note that Orkney does not figure at all into the comparison of these ‘prized’ 
lands. This shows at least one of two things; either twelfth century writers took Orkney for 
granted  as  a  dominion  of  the  Norwegian  Crown,  or  it  was  not  itself  considered  to  be  an 
objective  so  much  as  a  tool.  Although  the  voyage  was  instigated  by  an  earl  in  search  of 
regaining power in Orkney, it was conquests further west which ultimately enticed the king to 
travel overseas.  
King Hákon Hákonsson’s fateful campaign against the Scots in 1263 marked the last 
time  a  Norwegian  king  would  venture  west  over  sea  (Sellar,  2000).  As  in  all  previous 
operations, Orkney played a crucial role, not as an objective per se, but as strategic breakpoint 
and as a place of respite. An ongoing dispute between the kings of Norway and Scotland over 
control of the Hebrides came to a head in 1262, when the King of Scotland, Alexander III, 
sponsored an attack on the islands of Skye. King Hákon responded by assembling a massive 
fleet and preparing Orkney and Shetland for the fleet’s arrival. The king sent envoys to gather 
pilots in Shetland and summon the king’s vassals, including the earl, in Orkney. In July 1263, 
the fleet set sail from Bergen toward Shetland and remained there for two weeks. It then moved 
south to Orkney, where it harbored in Shapinsay, conveniently close to Kirkwall. It was here 
that the campaign tactics were fully developed. Part of the fleet would split off to raid into the 
Moray Firth on the eastern coast of Scotland while the main contingent led by the king would 
sail west to the main objective, the Hebrides. Figure 1 above shows Orkney’s advantageous 
position in this respect. Situated roughly at the vertex of the region, it provided access to both 
coasts, allowing the king to flank his opponent from two sides. Despite this tactical advantage, 
the Norwegian forces were eventually pushed back at the Battle of Largs and, after suffering 
the effects of worsening weather, were, according to the Chronica de Mailros, forced “back 
home less honorably than they came”.
12 ‘Home’ in that context was Orkney. The Chronicon 
Manniæ et Insularum reports that “Haco, King of Norway came to Scotland, but effecting 
nothing returned to the Orkneys, and died at Kirkwall”.
13 Given the examples above, it is not 
surprising  that  Orkney  would  be  deemed  as  a  kind  of  ‘home’  for  the  Norwegian  king  by 
contemporary observers; it was the only set of islands in the region which were consistently 
and uncontestably subject to Norwegian lordship and thus the only respite for the battle worn 
Norwegian fleet. Hákonar saga hákonarsonar gives a rather detailed account of those dark 
winter days in Orkney, telling how estates were divvied out to the men for provision and how 
the king, growing increasingly weak from illness, took hospice at the bishop’s residence in 
Kirkwall. There, in the safe care of Orkney’s loyal bishop, the king died late that same year 
(HsH, 1977, pp. 207 8).  
 
                                                           
10 “Eyjar allar, þær er liggja fyrir vestan Skotland ok fara mætti stjórnfǫstu skipi milli ok meginlands.” (OSa, 
1987, p. 98). 
11 “Saltíri er mikit land ok betra en in bezta ey í Suðreyjum nema Mǫn.” (ibid., p. 98). 
12 “et sic turpius quam venerant repatriare” (CM, 1835, p.190). 
13 “Haco rex Norwagie ad partes scottiæ  et nihil expediens reversus est ad Orcades  ibidem apud Kyrkews 
mortuus” (CMS, 1860, p. 27).                                                                                   Orkney in the Medieval Realm of Norway 
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Norwegian expansion in the west ground to a halt in the late thirteenth century. As 
William P. L. Thomson explained, the “Viking age geography was changing. The seaways 
through the Hebrides were no longer the golden road which led to Norse Dublin” (Thomson, 
2001, p. 138). Norway had increasingly little to gain by continuing its forays in the west. 
According to Beuermann, a range of factors including “shifting trade patterns, the growing 
influence of the church, and increasing limitations to plunder by the thirteenth century would 
seem to have had a negative influence on the Manx Hebridean economy, and thus on possible 
renders to the Norwegian crown” (Beuermann, 2011, p. 97). If Norwegian kings were less keen 
to exploit their power, they were also less capable. The 1263 conflict underscored just how 
dated and ineffectual Norway’s levied navy was in the increasingly fortified margins of the 
Scottish realm (Barrow, 1990, pp. 138 40; Beuermann, 2006, p. 273). As war receded into the 
annals in the 1260s, so too did Orkney’s main traditional purpose in the Norwegian realm.  
 
Diplomacy 
 
King Hákon’s death in Orkney in 1263 was a watershed event in the history of the realm of 
Norway. No succeeding king of Norway ventured, for purposes of conquest or fortune, west 
oversea during the Middle Ages. Hákon’s direct successor, Magnus Hákonsson, was a more 
tactful,  diplomatic  leader,  more  concerned  with  the  stabilization  of  the  realm  than  its 
expansion. In 1266, the Kingdoms of Norway and Scotland came to a peaceful consensus and a 
fixed set of terms for future relations. The conditions of the so called Treaty of Perth were 
dominated by the question of royal dominion, most crucially over the disputed islands and 
inlands of the Hebrides and Man. Norway formally ceded all claims to those lands in exchange 
for Scottish recognition of its dominion over the islands of Orkney and Shetland. Implicitly, 
the region was thereafter bounded by a jurisdictional border running the length of the Pentland 
Firth. As a means of facilitating the peace, the King of Scotland pledged to provide the King of 
Norway  with  four  annual  payments  totally  4,400  marks  over  the  next  four  years,  plus  an 
additional 100 marks in annuity and forever. These payments formed the basis of a long term 
diplomatic relationship between the kingdoms in which Orkney was to take an ambassadorial 
role in fostering. The text stipulates that the first payment was to be made “within eight days of 
the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, in Orkney, that is to say, the land of the lord the King of 
Norway, in the church of St. Magnus, into the hands of the Bishop of Orkney or the bailiff of 
the lord the King of Norway specially deputed by him for this purpose” (ToP, 1862, p. 213).
14 
All subsequent payments were to be paid in the same manner.  
Whereas Orkney’s proximity to the Scottish mainland had previously been an asset in 
war, it was after 1266 a medium for peace. Norway’s clarification of dominion meant that 
Orkney was, both in notion and in law, a “land of the lord the King of Norway” and thus a 
relatively safe and convenient drop point for substantial and important financial transactions. 
By transferring the sum directly across the Pentland Firth and depositing it with Norwegian 
agents on Norwegian soil, Scotland minimized the logistical risks of conveying their annual 
payments across the North Sea to Norway. Furthermore, Orkney offered a suitably developed 
civic infrastructure for such a transaction. As the seat of the Bishopric of Orkney and the home 
of St. Magnus Cathedral, Kirkwall was a favourable point of congregation for royal agents and 
                                                           
14 “infra oetavas Nativitatis Saneti Johannis Baptistæ in Orcadia terra scilicet Domini Regis Norvegiæ, in ecclesiæ 
Sancti  Magni,  in  manibus  Episeopi  Orchadiæ,  sen  Ballivi  ipsius  Domini  Regis  Norvegiæ,  ad  hoc  per  issum 
specialiter deputati” (DN, VIII, p. 14). I. P. Grohse 
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a safe depot for large sums of money. The fact that the bishop, as opposed to the earl, was 
picked as the primary  mediator for the transactions also exemplifies the shifting nature of 
Norwegian Scottish  relations.  Whereas  the  earldom  had  served  its  purposes  as  a  military 
agency, the bishopric had frequently functioned as a diplomatic agency.  During King Hákon 
Hákonsson’s campaign in 1263, for instance, Orkney’s bishop was chosen to lead an attempted 
negotiation  of  peace  before  the  outbreak  of  open  warfare  (HsH,  1977,  p.  202).  Earls,  by 
contrast, were bound to military service, both before and after 1266, and were rarely employed 
as suitable agents in formal diplomatic negotiations or transactions (Crawford, 1969, p. 44).  
  In 1290, Orkney was chosen as the setting for a momentous diplomatic exchange: the 
transfer  of  custody  over  Margaret,  the  ‘Maid  of  Norway’.  Born  in  1283  to  King  Eric 
Magnusson of Norway and Margaret, daughter to King Alexander III of Scotland, the infant 
Margaret was very much a symbol of the newly established Norwegian Scottish peace. But she 
also  served  a  more  practical  purpose.  As  the  sole  surviving  descendent  of  the  late  King 
Alexander III, the infant Margaret was set to succeed to the Scottish throne. With the child still 
in  her  Scandinavian  homeland,  diplomats  from  Norway,  Scotland  and  England  feverishly 
crisscrossed the North Sea in order to negotiate the girl’s marriage to the prince of England and 
her transfer to British soil. King Eric eventually placed the girl in the care of a Norwegian 
bishop and an entourage of Norwegian and foreign envoys who would accompany her on her 
westward journey. It is notable, but not surprising, that the chosen route to Scotland rounded 
the shores of Orkney. As we have seen, it was a tried and trusted point of call for Norwegian 
voyages in the west and offered a convenient intermediary point for envoys to confer. As 
Barbara  E.  Crawford  suggested,  it  is  likely  that  the  royal  party  was  to  be  housed  as  the 
episcopal residence in Kirkwall, the same which housed King Hákon Hákonsson in his final 
weeks  in  1263  (Crawford,  1990,  p.  175).  That  site’s  reputation,  however,  was  once  again 
marred  by  tragedy  when  the  young  girl  “died  in  the  arms  of  Bishop  Narve  of  Bergen  in 
Orkney” in late September, 1290 (DN, VI, pp. 104 5). Orkney’s role in the affair is further 
witnessed  by  several  references  to  it  in  a  catalogue  of  expenses  incurred  there  by  King 
Edward’s envoys during their preparations for the girl’s arrival in the isles (DN, XIX, p. 257). 
This demonstrates that not just the Norwegian king, but also the English, accepted Orkney as a 
suitable setting for such a momentous occasion.   
There  is  no  further  evidence  that  Orkney  was  planned  as  the  setting  for  a  major 
assembly  of  Norwegian  and  Scottish  envoys;  but,  given  its  logistical  advantages,  it  likely 
continued to be used as a break point for some North Sea crossings. There is some evidence 
that it was used as a safe haven for fugitive devotees of the Bruce faction during the Scottish 
Wars of Independence. In 1307, King Edward I complained to King Hákon Magnusson that the 
Bishop  of  Moray,  an  outlaw  of  the  English  Crown  and  staunch  supporter  of  the  Bruce 
opposition, had been “hosted by some of your subjects in the islands of Orkney” (DN, XIX, pp. 
545 6). Though unconfirmed, there is also a tradition that Bruce himself spent his time in exile 
in the isles (Thomson, 2001, p. 148). True or not, it is clear that his wife and her entourage 
were heading north for safety when they were captured by allies of the English Crown, and it 
has  been  suggested  that  they  too  might  have  been  seeking  refuge  in  Orkney,  a  safe  and 
sovereign domain of Norway (ibid., p. 148). 
    
 
                                                                                  Orkney in the Medieval Realm of Norway 
  265
The Norwegian Crown often relied on its officials in Orkney to foster their relations 
with Scotland and England. The most prodigious example was Weland de Sticklaw, a Scottish 
cleric  who  in  the  1290s  served  in  the  royal  administration  and  diplomatic  corps  of  the 
Kingdom of Norway (Crawford, 1990). In addition to his specific diplomatic duties, Weland 
also held an individual grant to “guard the body” of Magnus Jonsson, the presumed heir to the 
earldom, as well as governorship over the province as a whole (Crawford, 1990, pp. 178 9). 
These  offices  required  individuals  “who  were  familiar  with  the  political  scene  in  other 
countries, and who spoke the necessary languages” (ibid., p. 179). Situated between different 
political,  social  and  cultural  spheres,  Orkney  was prime  medium  for  fostering  connections 
across the Norwegian Scottish border. This explains why Weland, an individual who needed to 
maintain his activeness in the societies and politics of different lands, was commissioned to 
govern it on behalf of the Norwegian Crown.  
Disputes concerning Orkney did crop up in the early fourteenth century, though these 
were resolved largely through diplomatic concession. When the Treaty of Perth was renewed 
in 1312, King Hákon Magnusson of Norway and King Robert the Bruce of Scotland saw fit to 
negotiate a resolution to a series of outstanding injuries and claims made by their respective 
subjects  in  Orkney.  Certain  unnamed  ‘malefactors’  from  Scotland  had  previously  invaded 
Orkney, captured a Norwegian official, stolen his goods and held him until he paid a ransom. 
In retribution, the Orcadians seized, beat, imprisoned and held to ransom an armiger of King 
Robert.  Although  neither  aware  of  nor  responsible  for  the  original  attacks,  King  Robert 
expedited the settlement with a repartition payment of 600 marks sterling to be paid to King 
Hákon’s officials at St. Magnus Cathedral in Orkney (DN, III, p. 245). As an apparent gesture 
of goodwill, King Robert also confirmed a £5 donation which had previously been taken from 
the toll collections of Aberdeen and deposited annually to St. Magnus Cathedral in Kirkwall. 
That gift remained a symbol of the Scottish Crown’s amicable stance toward Orkney’s church 
for years to come, appearing in numerous accounts from the Exchequer Rolls throughout the 
Middle  Ages  (Thomson,  2008,  p.  149).  This  shows  that  St.  Magnus  Cathedral,  the  most 
important edifice in the isles, was still a useful and much valued institution for diplomacy. 
Norwegian Scottish  diplomatic  relations  languished in  the  late fourteenth  and  early 
fifteenth centuries. As a result, the annual payment of 100 marks prescribed in the treaty from 
1266, and confirmed in its renewal from 1312, fell deeply into arrears. In 1426, Norwegian and 
Scottish delegates assembled in Bergen, Norway to discuss the resumption of that payment. 
Among  the  delegates  was  Bishop  Thomas  Tulloch  of  Orkney,  who  was  given  “a  special 
mandate” in leading the talks on the Norwegian king’s behalf (DN, VIII, p. 309). The bishop’s 
special function at that meeting corresponded to his intended role in the resumption of the 
annual payment. This is expressed clearly in a separate document issued several months later 
in which the bishop reiterates to the king that the payment should be made either to himself or 
to another civic administrative official in Orkney (DN, II, p. 513). Whether or not the payment 
actually resumed is unclear (Crawford, 1969, p. 39); but the case nonetheless demonstrates that 
Orkney was still considered a suitable depot for the transaction. It also underscores the pivotal 
role of the bishop in cultivating Norwegian Scottish relations, even at that late date. In the 
fifteenth century, Orkney’s bishops were natives of Scotland, and it would appear that their 
familiarity  with  Scottish  society  as  well  as  their  multilingual  communication  skills  were 
regarded as diplomatic assets.  
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The  mediation  skills  of  Orkney’s  bishops  came  to  bear  once  more  in  1468,  when 
delegates of the Norwegian and Scottish kings met in Copenhagen to negotiate the terms of 
Princess Margaret of Denmark’s marriage to King James III of Scotland. There it was agreed 
that, in order to cover part of the princess’ dowry, Christian I, King of Denmark and Norway, 
would pledge Orkney to Scotland for the value of 50,000 Rheinish florins. Orkney’s bishop, 
William Tulloch, was one of the delegates at the meeting, though not as a representative of the 
Danish Norwegian Crown, but as a general member of the Scottish embassy (NgL II, pp. 184 
5). What might initially appear to have been an act of treason was in fact appreciated by the 
Danish Norwegian king, who later commended the bishop and recommended that he serve as 
Princess Margaret’s tutor until she learned to speak the Scots English of her new homeland 
(Crawford, 1969, p. 50).  Not viewed as irregular by contemporaries, the bishop’s involvement 
in that affair was very much emblematic of the changing course of Orkney’s medieval history: 
Whereas its earls had previously served in the violent expansion of Norwegian power in the 
west, its bishops later facilitated Norway’s peaceful, gradual withdrawal.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The scattered source material pertaining to medieval Orkney means that most discussions, like 
the preceding, must largely rely on circumstantial evidence. But taken together, that evidence 
reflects several major trends in Norway’s association with and utilization of Orkney in its 
foreign affairs. For much of the Middle Ages, Orkney was valued as the Norwegian Crown’s 
most secure and frequented base for military operations in the west. This is exemplified first by 
the fact that every major Norwegian naval campaign into Britain or the Irish Sea included 
either a brief or extended stop in those isles. The fact that Norwegian kings never ventured to 
Orkney as a final destination also demonstrates that it was a means, rather than an end, for 
Norwegian  campaigns.  It  was  not  until  Norway’s  conciliation  with  Scotland  in  1266  that 
Orkney moved from the interior to the forefront of the frontier. The curtailment of Norwegian 
power  in  the  west  and  the  establishment  of  a  more  rigid  border  led  the  Crown  to  take  a 
different  approach  toward  its  island  province  in  the  late thirteenth  and  early fourteenth 
centuries. Orkney’s proximity to Scotland proved to be as much an asset for diplomacy as it 
once had been for war. It was easily accessed from the Scottish mainland and offered a secure 
assembly point in St. Magnus Cathedral in Kirkwall. Its officials were receptive to the differing 
mores  of  Norse,  Scottish  and  even  English  societies  and  thus  adept  at  representing  the 
Norwegian king before his foreign counterparts.  
In these respects, Orkney was unique in Norway’s overseas realm. None of the other 
island provinces figured so prominently in Norway’s foreign affairs, nor were they constituted 
and developed so specifically for that purpose. But Orkney’s history, as well as its gradual 
marginalization, is also emblematic of the development of the Norwegian realm as a whole. In 
the Early and High Middle Ages, the Norwegian realm was the epitome of a thalassocracy, a 
sea borne realm under the naval supremacy of the Norwegian king. Beginning in the twelfth 
century, Norwegian efforts to expand its power in the west contracted and by the late thirteenth 
century, ceased altogether.  
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Orkney remained a medium for cultural and social transfer throughout the fourteenth 
and  fifteenth  centuries.  But  the  islands  themselves  diminished  in  importance.  Norway’s 
entrance into a dynastic union with Sweden, and later Denmark in the fourteenth century drew 
political attentions inward to Scandinavia and further east to the Baltic. Orkney, like all of the 
western tributary provinces, was relegated to the periphery of the realm (Wærdahl, 2011, p. 
271). As we have seen, it had never been the final destination for Norwegians in the west, but 
it had certainly once been an advantageous break point along a further, westward trajectory. 
Norway’s waning geopolitical interests in the west and in Britain deprived the archipelago of 
its previous significance in Norway’s foreign affairs. Although King Christian I’s pledge of 
Orkney in 1468 (and later of Shetland in 1469) was theoretically redeemable, later attempts to 
do so were irresolute and unsuccessful. Soon after its pledging, Orkney was integrated, step by 
step and irrevocably, into the Kingdom of Scotland.  
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